Abstract Despite the abundance of strategies in the multi-agent systems literature on repeated negotiation under incomplete information, there is no single negotiation strategy that is optimal for all possible domains. Thus, agent designers face an "algorithm selection" problem-which negotiation strategy to choose when facing a new domain and unknown opponent. Our approach to this problem is to design a "meta-agent" that predicts the performance of different negotiation strategies at run-time. We study two types of the algorithm selection problem in negotiation: In the off-line variant, an agent needs to select a negotiation strategy for a given domain but cannot switch to a different strategy once the negotiation has begun. For this case, we use supervised learning to select a negotiation strategy for a new domain that is based on predicting its performance using structural features of the domain. In the on-line variant, an agent is allowed to adapt its negotiation strategy over time. For this case, we used multi-armed bandit techniques that balance the exploration-exploitation tradeoff of different negotiation strategies. Our approach was evaluated using the GENIUS negotiation test-bed that is used for the annual international Automated Negotiation Agent Competition which represents the chief venue for evaluating the state-of-the-art multi-agent negotiation strategies. We ran extensive simulations using the test bed with all of the topcontenders from both off-line and on-line negotiation tracks of the competition. The results show that the meta-agent was able to outperform all of the finalists that were submitted to the most recent competition, and to choose the best possible agent (in retrospect) for more settings than any of the other finalists. This result was consistent for both off-line and on-line variants of the algorithm selection problem. This work has important insights for multi-agent systems designers, demonstrating that "a little learning goes a long way", despite the inherent uncertainty associated with negotiation under incomplete information.
Introduction
Multi-attribute negotiation under incomplete information is a well studied problem in multiagent systems and multiple agent strategies have been proposed for different types of settings and communication protocols [1] [2] [3] . However, it has been widely observed that no single negotiation strategy is optimal for all domains [4] . Thus, agent-designers for negotiation face the "algorithm selection problem", that is, which of a set of possible negotiation strategies to choose when facing an unknown negotiation partner or a new domain (or both), when the preferences of the negotiation partner as well as its negotiation strategy are unknown.
A straightforward solution to the algorithm selection problem is to measure the performance of different candidate strategies on a representative set of domains and opponent strategies and select the strategy that achieved the best average performance. This measure is commonly used to evaluate negotiation strategies in competitions, such as the international Automated Negotiation Agent Competition (ANAC), which is used as an empirical test-bed in this paper [5] . However, a negotiation strategy that was chosen based on average performance may fail miserably on an unknown domain, while some strategies that are deemed below average may actually provide good performance on a new, unseen negotiation domain. This type of behavior has been well documented on single-agent optimization settings such as SAT [6] .
The approach we use in this study relies on standard machine learning techniques to decide which negotiation strategy to choose for a new, unseen domain and opponent. We focus on bilateral multi-attribute negotiation settings of incomplete information where agents communicate using an alternating offer protocol, but do not know each other's preferences or negotiation strategies. As we will discuss in the next section, there is a plethora of work studying algorithm selection for single-agent problems in AI. We extend this body of work to the multi-agent case, where opponents' strategies are unknown, and which requires to define off-line and on-line variants of the problem as well as provide new solutions.
In the off-line algorithm selection problem, once a negotiation strategy is chosen it remains fixed and cannot change over time. For this case, we present a supervised learning approach that uses a set of features that encapsulate structural information about the domain and predict the performance of existing negotiation strategies on the new domain. We then select the negotiation strategy that is predicted to be most successful on the new domain based on its features.
In the on-line variant of the algorithm selection process, agents are allowed to switch their negotiation strategies over time based on their performance. For this case, we used a multiarmed bandit approach which balanced the exploration-exploitation trade-off associated with on-line learning. It learned a prior distribution over which negotiation strategy to choose using supervised learning, but also adapted to the negotiation domain over time by possibly switching negotiation strategies.
We demonstrate our approach empirically on a negotiation test bed that is used for the annual international ANAC. The competition includes many different negotiation domains and agent strategies that are composed by different researchers. During the competition, agents do not observe the identity and the preferences of their opponents. A negotiation setting in ANAC describes a set of issues and their possible values, and the private preferences of each agent are a weighted average over these issues that also take into account the agent's reservation value and discount factor.
We designed a "meta-agent" that uses the features of a negotiation domain to predict the performance of different agent strategies when competing against other agents in a domain.
The other agents consisted of past entries to the competition which represent the state-ofthe-art in the multi-agent systems negotiation research. We used two measures to predict the agent's performance when negotiating with an unknown opponent in the competition: directly predicting the agent's score in a negotiation, and the probability that the agent will outperform the other agents.
We evaluated the meta-agent using the actual negotiation strategies and domains that were submitted by different researchers in two recent ANAC competitions, including one in which agents were allowed to learn from past rounds and change their strategies over time. In both of the competitions, the meta-agent was able to significantly outperform the winner of the competition (the agent strategy that achieved the best average performance over all domains and all agents), and agree more often with an "oracle" that chose the optimal agent strategy for each domain in retrospect. We also show that our approach was able to generalize to the case in which the competition agents and the competition domains were not available for training.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, it defines the algorithm selection problem for multi-agent negotiation under incomplete information. Second, it shows the efficacy of using machine learning methods towards solving the problem in both off-line and on-line settings. Third, it empirically shows that the techniques significantly improve the state-of-the-art agents in an international competition setting. These results provide insights for agent-designers in negotiation, demonstrating that "a little learning goes a long way", and suggesting that the algorithm selection approach may also be feasible for other multiagent optimization problems such as planning and decision-making. This paper significantly extends a prior publication by the authors [7] by providing a formal approach for solving the algorithm selection problem in both offline and online settings, as well as evaluating the different approaches to this problem empirically.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related work in the algorithm selection problem and multi-agent negotiation. Section 3 defines the algorithm selection problem in negotiation and presents our setting and the ANAC test-bed. Sections 4 and 5 present algorithms for solving the off-line and on-line variants of the problem, respectively. Section 6 presents a discussion of our approach and future work.
Related work
Our work relates to two separate strands of research in artificial intelligence and the study of multi-agent negotiation strategies in multi-agent systems. We relate to each of these in turn.
Algorithm selection
The algorithm selection question in computer science can be phrased as: Which algorithm out of a set of possible candidates is likely to perform best for a well-defined problem [8] ? A general model for this problem is shown in Fig. 1 . In this diagram, for a given problem x, a set of features f (x) is extracted in order to describe the problem, and than used to select an algorithm A to solve the problem. The performance of the algorithm in this problem is than measured ( p( f (x), A) ).
Algorithm selection has been applied to a variety of optimization problems in the literature, including choosing regression or classification models, prediction, data compression, and protein detection. Smith [9] declared four conditions a problem should hold to be amenable to analysis using algorithm selection: (1) There are multiple instances of the problem with Fig. 1 A model for the algorithm selection problem diverse complexities; (2) There exist a set of possible algorithms for solving the problems with diverse complexity and performance; (3) There exist general and well defied metrics for measuring algorithm performance on the problem; (4) there is a set of known features that characterize problem instances that can be computed off-line and that correlate with the computational hardness/complexity of the problem.
The most widely-adopted solution to such algorithm selection problems is to measure every candidate solver's run-time on a representative set of problem instances, and then to use only the algorithm that offered the best (e.g., average or median) performance. However, many algorithms are not competitive on average but nevertheless offer very good performance on particular problems instances. This was formalized by the "No Free Lunch" theorem [10] , stating that for any algorithm, any elevated performance over one class of problems paid for in performance over another class, meaning there is no a-priory dominating algorithm over all problem instances. We demonstrate the no free lunch phenomenon on our empirical setting in the next section.
In the context of artificial intelligence, algorithm selection was used to solve classical optimization problem like constraint satisfaction and 3-SAT. For example, Lobjois et al. [11] chose the best algorithm for solving constraint satisfaction problems from a set of canonical branch-and-bound algorithms. They measured the run-time of the various algorithms for a given problem using an importance sampling technique for estimating the size of the search tree [12] . Other approaches have used case-based reasoning to select a solution strategy for instances of a constraint programming problems [13] [14] [15] .
More recently, machine learning approaches have been used to be able to select the best candidate algorithms for new, unseen problem instances based on features that are extracted from known problem instances. These approaches treat the candidate algorithms as "black boxes", and attempt to generalize features from known problem instances towards choosing the best algorithm for new problems.
We present some canonical examples of the machine learning approach to solving the algorithm selection problem. Xu et al. [6] used a variety of machine learning algorithms to select the best algorithm (in terms of running time) for solving 3-SAT satisfiability problems. They adapted the following generic steps towards using machine learning to solve the algorithm selection problem: (1) Collecting problem instances as training data. The problem instances should be well distributed and representative of the population of general problems in order to contain as much information and to avoid as much overlap between the problems. (2) Selecting a set of candidate algorithms; (3) Extracting a salient list of features to use to select the best algorithm. This process is conducted by a domain expert. The features need to be feasible to recognize and to infer during run time; (4) Creating a training set of known problem instances and candidate algorithm performance; (5) Using supervised learning to design a classification function from problem features to the set of candidate algorithms. In the study by Xu et al., it was important to select a small number of candidates, because they ran each of them for a small amount of time in order to look at their performances. Their algorithm, called SATzilla, received a problem and selected the solution algorithm that is predicted to solve the problem in the shortest time, based on the predefined feature set. The modelling process and the feature selection was done using forward selection and ridge regression techniques, making for a total of 48 features.
Guerri and Milano [16] used a decision tree to choose among several possible algorithms for determining the winner in combinatorial auctions. Other works used reinforcement learning and classification techniques to choose the branching rule to use when solving SAT problems [17] or to switch between different heuristics for solving quantified Boolean formulas [18] during the search. The focus of all of these works is single-agent combinatorial optimization problems with no domain uncertainty. Our setting differs because negotiation is a multi-agent optimization problem, and the performance of a negotiation strategy highly depends on the negotiation strategy used by other agents as well as their preferences, both of which are unknown to the selection algorithm. Thus there is a need to separately study the algorithm selection in these multi-agent combinatorial optimization settings.
Another approach to algorithm selection is to use evolutionary methods. Matos et al. [19] constructed negotiation strategies using genetic algorithms. This approach is not feasible for our setting because it assumes complete information. Au et al. [20] created an agent for playing canonical repeated games (like the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma game) that relies on analyzing interaction traces of past play. They developed an algorithm that can reconstruct an agent strategy by using only its interaction traces with other agent. Strategies were collected from a set of past games with various opponents and subsequently synthesized to form a meta-strategy that specifies an action for each state in the game in polynomial time. In simulation, they show that this strategy is able to enhance the performance of agents in the game compared to their original strategy.
Automated negotiation in incomplete information settings
Negotiation strategies have been studied in a wide variety of multi-agent settings, such as reaching agreement over joint resources or task assignments, revolving conflicts between buyers and sellers in electronic commerce, and bidding to allocate throughput in wireless applications [4, [21] [22] [23] [24] . Early approaches have assumed that the negotiation participants comprise solely autonomous computer agents that are self-interested. Specifically, Moehlman et al. [25] use negotiation as a tool for distributed planning: each agent has certain important constraints, and it tries to find a feasible solution using a negotiation process. Lander and Lesser [26] use a negotiation search, which is a multi-stage negotiation as a means of cooperation while searching and solving conflicts among the agents. Sycara [27] presented a model of negotiation that combines case-based reasoning and optimization of multi-attribute utilities. In her work agents try to use the negotiation protocol to influence the goals and intentions of their opponents. Kraus and Lehman [28] developed an automated Diplomacy player that negotiates and plays well in actual games against human players. Zeng and Sycara [29] consider negotiation in a marketing environment with a learning process in which the buyer and the seller update their beliefs about the opponent's reservation price using a Bayesian approach.
The algorithm selection approach uses algorithms to combine negotiation strategies written by or contributed by people (researchers and students). Indeed, the growing prevalence of computer agents in our daily lives have resulted in an abundance of work on negotiation between computer agents and human counterparts [3] . The approaches used by these works can be divided into three main themes: game theoretic, opponent modelling and logic. Game theoretic approaches to human-computer decision-making assume that agents and people optimize utility functions that may depend on a variety of attributes. These may include their performance in the negotiation, social preferences such as altruism or competitiveness, and features that relate to the negotiation protocol, such as time. The game is then analyzed to find the optimal negotiation strategies for the agent, assuming that people are also optimal with respect to their own utility function. Examples of this approach include Kraus et al. [30] who modeled human bilateral negotiations in a simulated diplomatic crisis characterized by time constraints and deadlines in settings of complete information. They adapted equilibrium strategies to people's behavior using simple heuristics, such as considering certain non-optimal actions. In an auction setting, Rajarshi et al. [31] has shown that computer agents using market equilibrium can outperform human bidders. Jonker et al. [32] designed computer strategies that involve the use of concession strategies to avoid impasses in the negotiation. Lastly, we mention the work by Cos and Sierra who designed a meta-strategy for combining two types of pre-defined negotiation strategies, one involving trade-offs in bargaining and one involving concessions [33] .
Our work also relates to the increasing use of using Peer-Designed Agents (PDA) who are agents designed by researchers and students for the purpose of evaluating agents in negotiation. The aggregate behaviour of PDAs has been shown to closely follow that of humans in some negotiation settings [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] and can thus be used as a proxy for measuring aggregate human behaviour. This can lead to considerable savings in cost and effort as compared to the case of running experiments evaluating agents' strategies when interacting with real people. The diversity exhibited by different PDAs have also led to their incorporation in distributed settings comprising solely computer agents, such as the Trading Agent Competition for Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM) [39] and Robocup [40] . This paper extends PDA research by showing the benefit of using PDAs written by other researchers towards solving the algorithm selection problem in multi-agent settings.
Problem definition
The algorithm selection problem in negotiation is defined as follows: Given a set of training domains D and training agents A, which agent to select from A to negotiate in each domain of a competition that includes a set of test domains D and test agents A ? Our approach to the algorithm selection problem is to construct a "meta-agent" that chooses an agent in A by predicting its performance in a test domain d ∈ D . The chosen agent strategy is subsequently evaluated against all of the negotiation strategies in the test set A on d. Importantly, once an agent strategy has been chosen, it is used to negotiate with all of the agents in the test-set and cannot be changed. In addition, the identity of the negotiation partner in A is not revealed to the agent at any point.
The paper studies three different cases of this problem:
1. The test domains are not known but the test agents are known, that is they are in the training set.
The fourth case of the algorithm selection problem, in which the set of test agents and test domains is known (A = A , D = D ), is less interesting because the single source of uncertainty in a test domain arises from non-determinism in agents' negotiation strategies. We do not explore this setting in the paper.
We emphasize that although the test agents are part of the training set, during the test phase their preference profile or negotiation strategy is not known to the meta-agent, following the rules of the negotiation in ANAC.
Bilateral negotiation setting
The empirical methodology of this paper is based on a class of bilateral negotiation settings commonly used in the literature to evaluate and compare between negotiation strategies under incomplete information [4, 21, 23, 24] . In our setting, a domain consists of a set of issues L. Each issue l ∈ L can take one of possible discrete values out of the set V l . The domain is common knowledge to the negotiating parties. A proposal p = (v 1 , . . . , v |L| ) is an assignment of values to all issues in L. Let P denote the set of all possible proposals in a domain. A negotiation round involves two participants termed Agent1 and Agent2. Each agent has a profile, that determines its valuation of a proposal, which is private information. The profile of Agent1 includes (1) a valuation function o 1 : V l → R mapping a value of issue l to the real numbers; (2) a weight vector for all issues W 1 = (w 1,1 , . . . , w 1,|L| ) where w 1,l is the weight of issue l; (3) a discount factor δ 1 ; (4) a reservation value r 1 . (The profile of Agent2 is defined similarly).
In a negotiation round, Agent1 and Agent2 make alternating take-it-or-leave-it offers to each other until a proposal is accepted, a predetermined deadline is reached or until the negotiation is terminated by one of the agents. Each agent has a role that determines whether the agent makes the first or second offer in the negotiation round. If an agreement is reached for a proposal p t at time t (between 0 and 1), the utility of Agent1 is
Otherwise, the utility of Agent1 is r 1 · δ t 1 (and similarly for Agent2). The score of an agent in a negotiation round is simply the utility it achieved in the round.
The ANAC test-bed
The ANAC is the premier venue for evaluating multi-agent negotiation strategies under incomplete information. ANAC was held consecutively four times between the years 2010 and 2014 under the auspices of the Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems Conference (AAMAS). The domains and preference profiles used during the competition are not known in advance and were designed by the participants themselves. There were between 15 and 20 agent submissions in each competition. The rules of encounter varied between competition years, but all of the competitions comprised a qualifying round, in which a subset of the submitted agents were chosen to compete in the finals. All of the domains and submitted agent strategies are made freely available as part of the competition objectives. We demonstrate an ANAC negotiation setting using one of the domains submitted by researchers to the competition. In the "laptop domain", two agents must agree on a laptop to purchase. Table 1 shows the profile of Agent1. Throughout this chapter we will use the same empirical setting and conditions used in the ANAC tournament. 1 Under these conditions, a "tournament" over a set of agents A and a set of domains D consists of multiple negotiation rounds between all agent pairs in A over all domains D for all possible profiles and all possible roles. This means that each agent pair negotiates four times in each domain on every round, once for each possible role and profile. Agents do not know the identity of their negotiation partners. The agents are "reset" at the onset of each negotiation round, meaning that no information about a domain or the history of past rounds is accessible (and no learning across rounds is possible). The winner of the tournament is the agent that achieved the highest average score over all of the negotiation rounds.
Interestingly, the fact that an agent is the overall winner of the tournament does not imply that the agent is optimal for every domain. This demonstrates the no-free-lunch phenomenon we discussed in the previous section. Figure 2 shows the performance of the winning agent of ANAC 2012 on 72 domains used in the competition finals. The y-axis measures the difference (in score) between an agent and the average score over all agents in each domain for each profile (x-axis). We show the score for each of the two profiles of every domain, and sort the domains in increasing order of performance for the winning agent. The black bars represent the score of the competition winner and the gray bars represent the score of the oracle strategy for each profile (the optimal agent choice computed in retrospect). As shown by the figure, the winning agent performed worse than average in 27 % of the profiles, and worse than the oracle in 82 % of the profiles. In particular, the optimal agent in one of the profiles of the laptop domain was "IAMhaggler2012" which came in 7th place in the overall tournament. These result highlight the algorithm selection problem facing agent designers that need to select the most suitable agent for a new domain.
Constructing domain features
We defined three types of features for any test domain d. An example of these features is shown in Table 2 . These features summarize all of the salient information about the negotiation domain and the profile of the negotiation partner that is available to the meta-agent. The first 
Number of possible proposals in the domain
Profile features Discount factor δ 1 0.5
Reservation value r 1 0.5
Standard deviation of weights over all possible issues
Average utility over all proposals at time t = 0
Standard deviation of all proposals at time t = 0
First proposal features Utility of first opponent proposal
Average utility of all "relevant" proposals at
Standard deviation of all "relevant" proposals at
type corresponds to domain information that is common knowledge to both negotiation parties. These include the following features:
-the number of issues in the domain (|L|), -the average number of values in each issue AV G({|V k | | ∀k ∈ L}) -the number of possible proposals in the domain |P| = k∈L |V k | The above features describe the level of complexity of the domain. For example, a domain with fewer number of possible issues or proposals may be easier to negotiate and less demanding in computation time.
The second type of features corresponds to an agent's profile which is private information. We describe these features from the point of view of Agent1 at time 0 (when it is needed to select an agent):
-the discount factor δ 1 , -the reservation value r 1 , -the standard deviation of weights over all possible issues (S D({w 1,k | ∀k ∈ L})).
-the average utility at time t = 0 over all possible proposals in the domain (AV G({u 1 
). -the standard deviation of its utility over all possible proposals P ({S D({u 1 
These features indicate the complexity of a negotiation from the point of view of a private profile. In addition to the discount factor and reservation value which can directly influence the agent score, the other features try to see how flexible should the agent be in order to succeed in such domains. In particular, we hypothesized that the standard deviation over the weight values of issues can carry important information about the domain. For example, high variance means some issues are more important than others, and a "smart" agent will learn to focus on these issues. In contrast, we did not expect the average weight value to have an effect on the negotiation performance.bf
The third type of features corresponds to information that is inferred from the first proposal p that Agent1 receives from Agent2. These features include:
-the utility of agent Agent1 at time 0 from the proposal (u 1 ( p )), -the average utility at time 0 of all proposals that are preferable to Agent1 than p (in other words, all relevant proposals to Agent1) (AV G({u
, -the standard deviation over the utility over all such preferable proposals (S D({u 1 
Off-line algorithm selection
In the off-line variant of the algorithm selection problem, a chosen agent strategy is used to negotiate with all of the agents in the set of test domains D and cannot be changed across domains. In other words, we cannot "change horses" in the middle of the testing phase.
Definitions
We now describe the design of a class of meta-agents that use standard machine learning algorithms to predict the performance of different agents in a negotiation round. We assume a one-to-one correspondence between an agent i ∈ A and its negotiation strategy; we use i to refer to either. Let s d i, j denote the average score for agent i that negotiates with agent j on domain d over several rounds. Let s
denote the average score for agent i that negotiates in domain d over all negotiation opponents in the set O. The optimal agent in the training set A for a domain d is associated with the highest average score when negotiating with all of the opponent agents in O.
We used canonical supervised learning algorithms to predict the performance of agents given a domain d and a set of opponent agents. Let
the average score of all agents in the opponent set O that negotiate with each other in domain d.
Performance measures
We
). There are two motivations for choosing this measure. First, the variance over agents' performance differs widely across domains. Indeed, some domains submitted by researchers were strictly competitive (zero sum) while others, such as the laptop domain, were not. Thus, measuring performance relative to agents' average score within each domain standardizes their performance. Second, it selects the best agent in the training set because it directly predicts agents' scores on the test domains.
The second measure of performance predicted whether an agent i is a "winner" when negotiating with any agent k ∈ O on a domain d. The motivation for using this measure is that using a suboptimal agent may be successful in practice if it is nearly as good as the best agent. This measure was represented by a Boolean variable was set to "true" if the absolute difference between the agent's score and the optimal agent in the domain was within a single standard deviation (AB S(s
. Given that we are running hundreds of thousands of negotiation instances, the scores obtained in the negotiation rounds of each domain approximate a normal distribution, and one standard deviation so the distance from the average score of the optimal agent will be reasonable close.
Algorithms
We used several different learning methods that vary in the number of parameters and algorithmic complexity. First, a standard linear regression model over the domain features, (denoted "LinReg"), employing the forward-backward algorithm to choose the best features over a held-out set in each fold [41] . Second, to capture more complex, non-linear interactions among the different features, we used two separate methods. A regression tree classifier (denoted "CART") to recursively partition the dataset to smaller regions of the data set, fitting a regression model at each cell of the partition, represented as the leaf of the tree [42] . In addition, we used a neural network (denoted "NN") over the domain features with a single hidden layer with 4 nodes, which has been shown to work well in practice for predicting performance in bilateral negotiation [43] . We used an early stopping rule after 150 iterations. We used the "R" statistical package for all learning methods [44] .
We used classification methods for determining the probability that an agent is a winner: a classification tree (denoted "CART (class)"), a logistic regression model (denoted "LogReg"), and a neural network with the same structure as described above, denoted "NN (class)". All of these classifiers computed the probability that an agent is a winner for a specific domain and features.
An example of the CART learned model for one of the agents in our empirical setting (AgentLG) is shown in Fig. 3 Both models agree that the feature WeightSTDev is indicative of performance, and also weigh this feature in a similar way (the smaller the deviation, the better the agent). However, the two models differ widely in the other features.
The algorithm used by the meta-agent to choose an agent strategy is given in Fig. 4 . The input to the algorithm is a set of training domains D and training agents A. This training data is used to learn (off-line) the models described above. Following the rules of the competition described earlier, the meta agent does not observe the opponent profiles in d and the agents in the competition are not identified. Given a test domain d ∈ D the agent first checks whether d is already known in the trainng set of domains (d ∈ D) (line 4). In this case, the best the meta-agent can do is to select the agent in A that achieved the best performance in d (line 5).
Otherwise, the meta-agent collects the features it needs to predict the best agent to use for the test domain d. Features that relate to the domain and the agents' profiles in the domain can be computed directly. To get the first-proposal features, the meta-agent needs to receive an offer from Player 2. Therefore the meta-agent proceeds as follows. If it is a proposer, it makes the proposal that provides it with maximal utility (line 7). If it is a responder, it will receive an offer from Agent2, which it will use to compute the first-proposal features (line 8). At this point the agent can get the full feature list for the domain F(d, p ) (line 9). An example for this feature list is given in Table 1 for the laptop domain. The meta-agent proceeds to use the feature list to predict performance for each of the training agents in A on the test domain d (line 11). Finally, the meta-agent chooses the agent-strategy that maximizes the predicted performance, breaking ties randomly (line 12). For example, suppose the utility of the first offer by Agent2 is 0.3, the value of the reservation value is 0.2, the value of the discount factor is 0.81, the domain size has 400 issues, and the value of the standard deviation of weights is 0.11. In this case, the prediction of the CART model for the performance of the AgentLG agent will be 0.055, while the prediction of the linear regression model for the same agent will be 0.0088.
In this algorithm, the meta-agent postpones making a commitment about which agent strategy to choose for as long as possible, in order to collect as much salient information about the domain and its opponent. This is the right approach, because once an agent strategy is chosen, it will be used to negotiate with all of the agents in the test-set and cannot be changed. Another reason why the first offer from Agent2 is important is that it acts as a reference point for the meta-agent. In the worst case (if agreement has not been reached and we are reaching the time deadline), the agent can make this offer while knowing that there is a high probability that the negotiation partner will accept it.
Essentially, the algorithm above describes a general class of meta-agents that depend on which learning method and performance predicting measure is used. The run-time of the algorithm is dominated by the feature selection process, which is polynomial in the size of the bid space in the domain. In practice, this process terminated in less than a second for each domain on a commodity core i5 computer.
Results
We report results on a data set that included seven agents and 72 domains (144 profiles) that were used in the finals of the ANAC 2012 competition. 2 We selected training domains and agents from this set, and compared the performance of the meta-agents on each test domain d ∈ D using the different learning and performance measures to the following negotiation strategies. (1) the "AvgBest" strategy: selecting the agent in A associated with the maximum score averaged over all training domains in D and training agents A (max i∈A (AV G{s
). This strategy, is equal to choosing the winning agent in A according to its average performance when negotiating with all agents in the training set (using the same rules as in the ANAC competition). (2) the "Oracle" strategy: selecting the agent in A associated with the maximum score on test domain d (s d,A * of Eq. 2) assuming retrospect knowledge of the test agents A . This strategy assumes perfect knowledge of agents' performance on the test domains. All of the competition parameters were set exactly as in the finals of the ANAC 2012 competition. In particular, each tournament was run 10 times to account for the fact that agents' bargaining strategies may not be deterministic. In all, we ran 35,280 different negotiation rounds. Under the rules for the 2012 competition, the negotiation agents were "reset" between negotiation rounds. This means that agents could not model each other's negotiation strategies over time. Note that we relax this assumption in Sect. 5. In terms of runtime, the bottleneck for all of the approaches was running the thousands of negotiation rounds (with a 1 minute deadline for making offers in each round, a negotiation tournament may take several hours on a commodity i5 core computer) rather than the learning algorithms.
New domains; known agents
We first present results for the case in which the set of testing domains is new, while the set of testing agents is equal to the set of training agents (A = A , D ∩ D = ∅). This setting corresponds to situations in which one has negotiated with the test-agents in the past, but in different domains than those in the test set. Since the nature of the domain significantly affects the negotiation behavior of the agent, and the identity of the negotiating agent is not disclosed during the negotiation, there is uncertainty about which agent strategy is optimal for each of the domains in the test-set.
We used K fold cross-validation, setting K at 6. For each fold, we used 60 domains for training the meta-agents and 12 domains for testing. Figure 5 shows the average scores obtained by the meta-agents as well as the Oracle and AvgBest scores. As shown by the figure, all of the meta-agents were able to significantly outperform the AvgBest agent ( p < 0.008 for all meta-agents). The best results were obtained by the meta-agent using CART method. However there was no statistically significant difference in performance between the metaagents themselves (Friedman non-parametric test: p = 0.18).
To explain the success of the meta-agents, we measured the number of times their score in each testing domain was better or worse off than the average score (over all the training agents) in the domain. Specifically, we say that a meta-agent has made a "good" agent choice in A for a test domain d if the agent i that was selected by the meta-agent achieves a score s d i in the negotiation round that is higher than the average score s d of all training agents that negotiate in d. Figure 6 shows the number of good agent choices for all meta-agents and the AvgBest agent. Also shown in the figure is the number of times that the meta-and AvgBest agents selected the optimal agent for domain d, that is their agent choice agreed with the oracle choice. As shown by the figure, all of the meta-agents made significantly more good agent choices than the AvgBest agent ( p ≤ 0.045) and agreed significantly more often with the oracle choice than did the AvgBest agent ( p ≤ 0.014). To illustrate, we describe results obtained in the competition when d equalled the laptop domain that was introduced earlier. For one of the preference profiles of this domain, AvgBest agent chose to use the agent called "TheNegotiatorReloaded", which achieved the highest average score over all of the training domains. However, this agent came in fifth when competing against the other agents on this profile of the laptop domain. In contrast, the vast majority of the meta-agents (five out of six) chose the agent called "IAMHaggler2012" which was the optimal agent (agreed with the Oracle choice) for this profile.
As when comparing score, there was no significant difference between the meta-agents for making good choices and agreeing with the oracle choice. However, the meta-agent using LogReg achieved the lowest significance threshold of p = 0.045 for making good choices and p = 0.014 for agreeing with the oracle choice. The other meta-agents achieved a higher significance threshold ( p < 0.015) for making good choices, p < 0.001 for agreeing with the oracle choice.
We also implemented an alternative algorithm selection mechanism that is based on Knearest neighbor similarity metric, which was used in several algorithm selection works in the literature [45, 46] . For a given target negotiation domain, this technique selects the negotiation strategy that performs best on the K -domains in the training set that are deemed most similar to the target domain. The similarity metric is based on prior experience with the most similar domains. 3 We used the Euclidean distance on all of the features in the algorithm. Each feature was (linearly) normalized to fit the interval [0, 1] across all training instances. As shown in Fig. 5 this approach was significantly outperformed by all of the meta-agents. In fact, the normalized performance score of the KNN agent (0.651) was not statistically significant different than the performance of the AvgBest agent. Figure 6 shows that the KNN agent made significantly less Good and Oracle choices than did all the other meta-agents.
Lastly, to study the scalability of our approach, we varied the number of training domains while keeping the set of the competition domains constant. Figure 7 shows the scores of all meta-agents when tested while using 40, 50 or 60 domains. As expected, the performance of all of the meta-agents decreased as we reduced the number of training domains. Interestingly, the meta-agents using regression methods (LinReg and LogReg) exhibited no significant drop in performance between the different domain sizes. Moreover, for the lowest domain size of 40, the LinReg meta-agent significantly outperformed meta-agents using other methods ( p < 0.04). These results suggests that regression models are the most robust to use when the set of training domains is small. 
New agents; known domains
We now present results for the case in which the set of testing agents is new, but the set of testing domains is equal to the set of the training domains (A ∩ A = ∅, D = D ). This setting corresponds to situations in which the agent is already familiar with the negotiation domains in the test-set, but has never interacted with the agents in the test-set. The agent will negotiate with agents it has not seen before on familiar domains. We used K fold cross-validation, setting K at 3. For each fold, we used 4 agents for training and 3 agents in the test set. When the set of training domains is held constant, all of the meta-agents will choose the same agent that is associated with the highest score max i∈A (s d i ) for domain d ∈ D (line 2 in the algorithm of Fig. 4) . It is interesting to note the distinction between the meta-agent choice and the AvgBest agent, which will choose the agent associated with the highest average score over all domains in D, and the Oracle agent, which will choose the agent associated with the highest score s d * with retrospect knowledge of the testing agents A . Figure 8 compares the performance of the meta-agent to the AvgBest and Oracle agent. We list a single result for each domain to represent all meta-agents as they all incur the same score from their agent-choice in this setting. As shown by the figure, the meta-agents significantly outperform the "AvgBest" agent ( p = 9 × 10 −16 ), demonstrating the applicability of our approach to this setting. The fact that the Oracle agent significantly outperformed the metaagent ( p = 9 × 10 −31 ) attests to the dependence of any negotiation strategy on the strategy used by the other (unknown) agents even when the domain is known.
New agents; new domains
We now turn to the most challenging case, in which both the set of test domains and test agents is new. (A ∩ A = ∅, D ∩ D = ∅). This is the setting that was considered in the ANAC competition. This corresponds to the situation in which the agent has never interacted with the negotiation domains in the test-set nor with the set of agents in the test-set. For each fold in our cross-validation, we used a set of 60 domains and 4 agent for training the meta-agents and 12 domains and 3 agents in the test sets. Figure 9 compares the performance of the different meta-agents to the Oracle and AvgBest agents. Not surprisingly, the performance of all of the meta-agents decreased as compared to the settings in which the test agents or domains was known. Interestingly, the Oracle agent, which serves as our upper bound, also decreased in performance, which we attribute to the smaller size of the set of training agents as compared to the settings in which the agents were known (four training agents rather than seven). Note that the meta-agent outperforms AvgBest by a difference of 0.01 points (score of 0.65 vs. 0.64). However, the Oracle strategy (which is an upper bound) in this setting achieved an average score of 0.692. Compared to this upper bound, the meta-agent achieves a 28 % improvement over Avg-Best strategy).
Despite these difficulties, all of the meta-agents outperformed the AvgBest agent in score ( p < 0.01 for all meta-agents). The difference in score between meta-agents was once again not significant. Figure 9 shows the number of good agent choices for all meta-agents and the AvgBest agent, and the measure of agreement with the Oracle agent. The results agree with those obtained for other settings in that all of the meta-agents made significantly more good agent-choices than the AvgBest agent ( p < 0.017), and agreed more often with the Oracle agent-choice ( p < 0.002). The number of oracle-choices made by the meta-agent using the CART (Class) method was (statistically) significantly higher than the other meta-agents ( p < 0.013).
Lastly, to measure the relative improvement of the different approaches we compared their performance against a random agent choice that picked an arbitrary negotiation strategy. This random agent obtained an average score of 0.45, and was able to make perfect choices in 13.38 % of negotiation instances (which is similar to the probability of choosing a single strategy out of seven equally-likely possible strategies (1/7) . The best meta-agent exhibited performance that outperformed this strategy by up to 24 % in score and in the good-agent choice (Fig. 10) . 
On-line algorithm selection
In the previous section, choosing the negotiation strategy was performed "off-line" under the assumption that agents do not aggregate information across domains and do not adapt their negotiation strategies accordingly. This severely limits the ability of the meta-agent to adapt its selection of negotiation strategies when the learning is flawed (achieving low result on domains in the test set). To illustrate, we refer to the red and blue curves of Fig. 11 , which show the performance of the meta-and AvgBest agents of the Housekeeping domain in the ANAC competition, ordered by round number. The figure illustrates the limitation of the meta-agent strategy, in that it does not change a suboptimal negotiation strategy even if the performance of this strategy is consistently lower than that of the AvgBest.
To address this challenge, we introduce an on-line variant of the algorithm selection process in negotiation in which agents can change their strategy over time, as a function of their success against other agents in this domain. As in many on-line optimization problems, the crucial trade-off faced by the meta agent is choosing the agent-strategy that is associated with the highest expected payoff and "exploring" to get more information about how other agent strategies fare in the domain.
Past literature has addressed the on-line algorithm selection problem using one of three following approaches. When algorithm performance can be measured by computation time, one approach substitutes one algorithm that falls below a certain threshold for another algorithm [47] . Another approach measures algorithm performance on a smaller sub-problem in real-time and use this measure as a proxy to its performance on the complete problem [48] . A third approach is to quantify types of interactions and monitor only this amount [49] .
Given the multi-agent nature of our problem and that we cannot decompose negotiation tasks into constituent sub-problems, we chose a Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) approach for solving the on-line algorithm selection problem in negotiation. MABs are a basic model of sequential decision problems with an exploration-exploitation trade-off. This is the balance between staying with the option that gave highest payoffs in the past and exploring new options that might give higher payoffs in the future. Although the study of MAB dates back to the 1950s, exploration-exploitation trade-offs arise in several modern applications, such as ad placement, website optimization, and packet routing [50] .
In its most general form, the MAB problem models an agent that attempts to acquire new knowledge while optimizing its decisions based on existing knowledge. There exist a set of K distributions; each distribution is associated with the rewards delivered by one of the K "arms". Each time the agent chooses an arm, it receives a reward that is sampled from the appropriate distribution. The agent can observe the rewards over time but it doesn't know the underlying distribution. The objective of the agent is to maximize its reward over time. Our methodology comprised two types of multi-armed bandit agents.
Pure multi-armed bandit approach
The first type of MAB agent, we call a "pure" MAB agent (pure-MAB), makes no prior assumptions about the performance of each of the strategy agents. We consider each arm to be associated with a candidate agent's negotiation strategy. Let s d,O j denotes the estimate to the true mean performance of agent j in domain d given opponent strategies O, which is unknown to j. Because there is no separate test and training agent set in the MAB approach, we drop the O superscript. The objective of a Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB agent) in the online algorithm selection problem is to maximize the cumulative score that is obtained by the agent over time.
There are several approaches in the literature for solving MAB problems. Most notably the epsilon-greedy strategy consists of choosing a random lever with epsilon-frequency, and otherwise choosing the lever with the highest estimated mean [51] , and the soft-max strategy [52] which an arm is sampled according to a distribution that is an estimate of its performance (we refer the reader to the complete survey by Vermorel and Mohri [53] ). We chose an approach for balancing the exploration-exploitation tradeoff called UCB [54] because of several reasons: First, the UCB approach provides a (theoretical) upper bound on the agents expected regret from not choosing consistently the optimal "arm". In the context of the algorithm selection in negotiation problem, this means that we can limit the loss that is associated with bad agent choices by the meta-agent. Second, because it explores the environment to find profitable strategies while still taking the empirically best strategies more often. Lastly, the exploration rate for each negotiation strategy decreases to zero as the strategy is played infinitely often.
To model the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation, we used an algorithm from the MAB literature called UCB , in which agent strategy j is chosen to maximize the following equation:
where n j is the number of times that agent strategy j was chosen in the past, n is the number of total choices thus far, andσ d is a constant that was set to the standard deviation of all relevant bids in the domain. The
) component of the above equation represents an upper bound on the confidence level of the performance of agent j, and effects the exploration rate of the MAB agent. Whenσ d is high, the proposal space in the domain is large, and this increases the exploration rate of the agent.
The algorithm used by the pure-MAB agent is shown in Fig. 12 . The input to the algorithm is the set of known training agents A and a target domain d. If the strategy for agent i has not been used before (n i = 0), then the pure-MAB agent chooses that negotiation strategy in order to derive an estimate about the mean performance of i (line 5). Otherwise, an agent strategy is chosen that maximizes Eq. 4 (line 7). Some bookkeeping is performed after the chosen strategy i has negotiated with all test agents. The performance estimate of chosen strategy i is updated to reflect the average score s obtained by the strategy on all of the agents in the test-set (s) (line 9). The number of times that strategy i was used (n i ) and the total count of strategies n are also updated (lines 10-11).
We conducted an empirical evaluation of the multi-armed bandit approach using the ANAC 2013 competition test-bed, in which there were 18 agent-contestants and 33 domains. The rules of ANAC 2013 were updated to allow agents to collect data (under some constraints), model the environment and change their strategies between negotiation rounds.
Prior multi-armed bandit approach
The second type of agent, called "prior MAB" combines the supervised learning algorithm that was described in Sect. 4.3 with the UCB approach. It obtains a prior estimate of the performance of the agent strategies in the training set prior to the tournament. This approach was initially suggested by Pannagadatta and Thorsten [55] , but was evaluated on synthetic data.
The algorithm used by this agent is given in Fig. 13 . The algorithm obtains a prediction over the performance of each agent strategy in the training set A that has not been used before, in the same way to that of the meta-agent approach for new domains and new agents that is described in Sect. 4.4.3 (lines 5-10). The performance prediction for each strategy is multiplied the prediction by a constant K . This simulates K pulls of the "arm" corresponding to the agent strategy (line 11).
We hypothesized that combining the off-line and on-line aspects of our algorithm selection approach would facilitate this agent's ability to adapt to the environment and its opponents during the course of negotiation. We further hypothesized that both types of MAB agents will be able to outperform the meta-agent approach that uses supervised learning, because the meta-agent chooses a single negotiation strategy for the duration of the does not adapt to the environment over time.
Results
We conducted a study using all of the agents that were submitted to the ANAC 2013 competition. In ANAC 2012, all agents in the competition were reset every time they performed a new negotiation round. In ANAC 2013, the agents were reset each time they began a tournament on a given domain, so they could collect information between negotiation rounds on the same domain. However, agents still could not model other agents strategies, because it was not possible to carry over information about other agent strategies across domains, nor was the identity of the negotiation partner provided.
We used K fold cross-validation, setting K at 9. For each fold, we sampled 22 domains and 12 agents at random for training the prior MAB agent. We ran both pure and MAB agents on the test-set that includes the 11 other negotiation domains and the remaining 6 agents. This means that the test domains and test agents were not known to any of the meta-agents during testing. For the prior-MAB agent we set the K parameter (the number of times assigned to ear pull of the arm) was arbitrary set to 5 pulls. We compared the performance of both MAB agents to the meta-agent using the CART prediction strategy described in the previous chapter. We used the same evaluation measure used in ANAC 2013: for each agent pair, each negotiation round was performed 10 times. Figure 14 compares the performance of the MAB-pure and MAB-prior agents with the meta-agent on the domains in the test-set. Note that we could not measure whether that multi-armed bandit approach improves the number of good choices when compared to the oracle choice. The reason is that an oracle agent represents the best-agent choice in retrospect. However, in an on-line setting, the choice of one agent over another affects the negotiation strategy chosen by other agents. Thus the question of the oracle choice is ill-defined in this context. As shown by the figure, the MAB-prior agent significantly outperformed the meta-agent in the test-domains. 4 Interestingly, the pure multi-armed bandit agent (who did not establish a prior over the different negotiation strategies) was able to achieve comparable performance with the meta-agent after a learning period consisting of 60 % of the test rounds. The implication is that when prior learning is not possible or too costly, a pure multi-armed bandit is sufficient to achieve acceptable performance, albeit after some time.
We now analyze the performance of the MAB agents as a function of the number of rounds of negotiation. Figure 15 shows the difference in performance obtained by each of the MAB agents and the meta-agent on the aforementioned test-set. The x-axis represents the negotiation round n, and the y-axis represents the difference in score (as measured by
As shown by the figure, both MAB agents exhibited a steady increase in their performance over time, which is attested to their ability to adapt to the environment over time using the UCB algorithm. To illustrate, the performance of the prior-MAB agent is comparable to the meta-agent and AvgBest agent at the onset of the negotiation round, but is able to adapt and to select better negotiation agents over time (Fig. 11) .
The prior-MAB agent significantly outperformed the pure-MAB agent in each of the rounds. While the prior-MAB agent was significantly outperform the meta-agent from round two and on, the pure-MAB agent was able to achieve comparable performance with the meta-agent only after six exploratory rounds. We attribute this difficulty to the lack of prior information about the candidate agent's strategies.
To illustrate and explain the behaviour of the prior-MAB agent, Fig. 16 shows the agent's predictions of the performance of candidate agents at the onset of the negotiation tournament (first round) and the middle of the tournament (sixth round). The figure separates the candidate Fig. 16 Prediction for prior-MAB agent at onset (top) and sixth round (bottom) of tournaments strategy's predicted score (in blue) from the confidence interval representing the agent's uncertainty about the strategy performance (in green). As shown by the figures, in the onset of the negotiation, the best candidate agent strategy was ReuthLiron, and this strategy was chosen by the prior-MAB agent. In the sixth round, the prior-MAB agent decided to switch strategy and use TheFawkes agent strategy. This change in choice represents the exploratory element of the MAB approach, as the score obtained for TheFawkes (in blue, averaged over predicted score and performance in past rounds) was actually lower than the score obtained for ReuthLiron agent. The prior-MAB agent was entered in the ANAC 2013 competition, using the contestants of the 2012 competition as its different negotiation strategies. Its performance tied with TheFawkes candidate, and awarded second place due to exhibiting a higher standard deviation over the negotiation results.
Lastly, we provide a comparison between the performance of the Prior-MAB and the finalists of the 2013 and 2012 competition. This comparison is based on 18 selected domains. The domains were chosen to exhibit a wide variety in size and complexity, from 10 issues to over 10,000 issues. Figure 17 shows the performance of the agents in the final round, comparing to the seven finalists of ANAC 2013 and the three finalists of ANAC 2012.
As can be seen by the figure, the prior-MAB agent and TheFawkes agent tied for first place, significantly outperforming all other agent finalists. There was no statistically significant difference between the prior-MAB and TheFawkes agent. However, the variance of the prior-MAB agent was larger than that of TheFawkes agent. We attribute this to the relatively high degree of exploration that was employed by the MAB-prior approach.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we defined several variants of the algorithm selection problem in multi-agent negotiation, and suggested a machine learning approach towards solving this problem. Our empirical methodology is based on the ANAC competition test-bed and using the state-of-theart negotiation strategies that were submitted to the competition in the years 2012 and 2013. Our approach is shown to be able to outperform all of the negotiation strategies submitted to the competition. Specifically, in the off-line negotiation environment where agents cannot learn across domains, the meta-agents we designed were able to significantly outperform the average-best agent and to agree more often with the Oracle choice, even when both competition agent strategies as well as domains were not observed during the training. In the on-line negotiation environment in which the meta-agent was not able to adapt its strategy based on its performance, we designed a multi-armed bandit agent that was able to exhibit consistent improvement in performance over time. We showed that a combined approach, consisting of a multi-armed bandit agent that uses off-line learning to establish a prior belief over the different negotiation strategies, and on-line learning to trade-off exploration and exploitation is able to outperform the meta-agent. The robustness of our approach is also demonstrated in that it was able to generalize across different negotiation environments (offline and on-line) in different domains, without assuming any knowledge of the opponent's negotiation strategy.
Although "a little learning goes a long way" to solving the algorithm selection problem in negotiation, we note that there are several limitations associated with our approach. In the offline negotiation environment, the meta-agents agreed with the optimal agent-choice less than 40 % of the time, even in the best of cases. To explain this discrepancy, we note that the learning methods are significantly constrained by a condition imposed by the ANAC tournament where agents are reset between negotiation rounds, and the identity of the negotiation partner is not revealed. Consequently, agents cannot model the learning strategy of their opponents. There are two consequences to this for the meta-agent approach. First, the only information the meta-agent can use to solve the algorithm selection problem is encapsulated in the domain itself. Second, once an agent was selected by the meta-agent, it could not be replaced by another agent within a negotiation. 5 Lastly, we note a naive approach to use the entire history set of a negotiation round to modify the negotiation strategy is infeasible because the size of the history is exponential in the number of offers. Another limitation is with respect to the multi-armed bandit approach used for the on-line setting. The UCB algorithm we used is proven to converge for stationary environment and for an infinite number of iterations. Both of these assumptions may not hold in a multi-agent negotiation setting, in which the strategy of others may change and the number of possible negotiation rounds is bounded by a finite (may be quite small!) number.
We conclude this paper with several suggestions for future work. First, we intend to improve exploration in the on-line negotiation setting by combining the agent's learning gains in addition to its performance. Second, we will use the history of a negotiation round to estimate salient domain features that are unknown, such as the Nash equilibrium offer. These estimates can subsequently be used as features to select the agent for a new negotiation round in this domain. This approach was suggested by [56] for algorithm selection in quantified Boolean formulas. One limitation of our work is that we use the different learning models as "black-boxes". A future line of study is to prefer one learning model over another if its prediction falls within a predefined confidence measure. Such active learning techniques can help improve the exploration quality of on-line algorithm selection. Another area of future research addresses the uncertainty over the other negotiation partner's strategy. We intend to explicitly include a model of the strategy of other agents when considering which negotiation strategy to use for a new round and opponent. This also requires to change the ANAC competition rules to allow agents to save information between negotiation rounds with different partners. Lastly, we intend to apply the algorithm selection approach to other types of multi-agent interactions such as voting and coordination.
